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A B S T R A C TObjectives: When quality-adjusted life-years are used for economic
evaluation, the controversial issue of ‘‘double counting’’ of produc-
tivity loss emerges, particularly given the lack of empirical data.
Methods: In this study, we performed a Web-based, large-sample
survey to address the issue of double counting. To determine the
influence of income reduction on utility scores, we obtained utility
scores of eight health states with three instruction types: a) no
instruction, b) instructed to consider income reduction, and c)
instructed not to consider income reduction (compensated).
Respondents were randomly sampled from the online panel and
asked to evaluate 1 of 24 patterns by both standard gamble and
time trade-off methods. Results: A total of 6551 respondents
completed the questionnaire. First, despite the lack of instruction
on income reduction, many respondents spontaneously assumed
lost income. The proportion tended to be higher when considering
more severe health states. Second, the degree of assumed incomesee front matter Copyright & 2013, International
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ndence to: Takeru Shiroiwa, Center for Public Heal
351-0197, Japan.reduction was related to utility scores. For a 10% income reduction,
respondents assumed a 0.02- to 0.04-decrease in utility score (both
standard gamble and time trade-off methods). Third, utility scores
did not change significantly when instruction was given not to
consider income reduction (compensated) compared with when no
instruction was given. Conclusions: An assumed income reduc-
tion clearly influenced utility scores; however, compensation for
lost income failed to sufficiently improve utility scores. In our view,
the effect of income on utility scores does not only reflect wage
loss. Our results suggest that the impact of double counting is
negligible.
Keywords: double counting, productivity loss, QALY, standard gamble,
time trade-off, utility scores.
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The role of economic evaluation is becoming more important in
many countries. Economic evaluation can clarify the relationship
between the value and costs of various therapies. The result of
economic evaluation depends on the perspective of analysis, such
as ‘‘health care payer’s perspective’’ or ‘‘societal perspective.’’ From
the health care payer’s perspective, only medical or relevant costs
are generally considered, whereas from the societal perspective, all
costs that occur in society are included in addition to medical costs.
In general, the societal analysis treats productivity loss as a
component of costs [1]. Here, we use ‘‘productivity loss’’ in the
limited sense of a patient’s own productivity change as a major
consequence of health care programs. The other change in
productivity (e.g., a family member taking time off to give care)
is also included from the societal perspective. Because individuals
other than the patient are not directly related to ‘‘double count-
ing,’’ only patient productivity loss is considered in this survey.Productivity loss can be measured by the human capital
method and the friction cost method, among others. The human
capital method uses wage to calculate productivity loss. Some
insist that the friction cost method should be used, however,
because full employment is not achieved in many developed
countries. Although no consensus has been reached regarding
the standard method for productivity loss calculation, these two
methods are frequently used. Many pharmacoeconomic guide-
lines recommend either one or both of these methods [2].
Productivity loss was defined as the loss of income and was
measured by using the human capital method; however, the cost
for another or new worker (e.g., costs of recruitment and training)
was measured by using the friction costs method. However, if
income is reduced because of illness, this may influence a
patient’s quality of life (utility scores). Accordingly, some insist
that productivity loss should not be included in costs when using
quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) because the QALY also reflects
the influence of work loss, and thus productivity, resulting inSociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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Fig. 1 – Decrease in utility score versus income reduction (instruction scenario c  instruction scenario b) measured by (A) SG
and (B) TTO method. SG, standard gamble; TTO, time trade-off.
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the cost (numerator) and the effectiveness (denominator) of the
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. For example, the Washing-
ton panel (i.e., Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medi-
cine in 1996) suggested that productivity costs associated with
morbidity should be included in the denominator so that the
QALY calculation captures the full impact of morbidity [3]. At
present, this represents one of the important views of treating
productivity loss in economic evaluation for health care
technologies.
There are, of course, some theoretical issues to consider [4–6].
As is well known, the Erasmus group [4,6] in The Netherlands
opposes treating productivity loss as part of the QALY calculation.
In addition, the Washington panel recommendation is not clearly
supported by empirical data. Some empirical surveys on the
relationship between QALYs and productivity have been per-
formed. In fact, a review of seven studies concluded that the
‘‘currently available empirical evidence on this issue cannot be
considered decisive or conclusive’’ and that ‘‘[t]here are some
inconsistencies between the conclusions of existing studies’’ [7].
Indeed, the proportion of those who spontaneously assume
income reduction without being instructed to do so differs
between studies [8–13]. It is still unclear whether utility scoreschange if instruction is provided or if income reduction is
spontaneously assumed. Some surveys detected statistically
significant differences between two utility scores, but others did
not. The influence of income loss on utility scores remains
inconclusive, although approximately 15 years have passed since
the suggestion of the Washington panel. One reason for this is
the small number of respondents and health states to be
evaluated (three or four at most).
Although some countries include the ‘‘societal perspective’’ in
economic evaluation guidelines, the inclusion or exclusion of
productivity loss is inconsistent. For instance, Sweden and [14]
The Netherlands [15] recommend analysis from a societal per-
spective that includes productivity loss, while Australia [16] and
Korea [17] do not. The double counting problem may not be the
only cause of this inconsistency; one possibility is that the
relationship between the QALY and productivity loss is confusing
for decision makers. If productivity loss considerably influences
utility scores, cost (including productivity loss) per QALY may be
underestimated; that is, such an analysis may be too favorable
for health care technologies. Given the importance of assessing
this relationship on the basis of clear empirical data, the aim of
this study was to examine the issue of double counting with a
large, Web-based survey (Fig. 1).
Table 1 – Background demographic factors.
n %
Age (y)
20–29 1280 19.5
30–39 1328 20.3
40–49 1295 19.8
50–59 1299 19.8
Z60 1349 20.6
Sex
Male 3262 49.8
Female 3289 50.2
Region
Hokkaido/Tohoku 636 9.7
Kanto 2641 40.3
Chubu 992 15.1
Kansai 1358 20.7
Chugoku 260 4.0
Shikoku 150 2.3
Kyushu 514 7.9
Household income (JPY 10,000)
o100 211 3.2
100–199 328 5.0
200–399 1555 23.7
400–599 1801 27.5
600–999 1846 28.2%
1000–1499 601 9.2%
1500–1999 128 2.0%
Z2000 81 1.2
Employment
Full-time employment 2857 43.6
Part-time employment 966 14.8
Self-employed 511 7.8
Homemaker 1686 25.7
Other (Retirement etc.) 531 8.1
Education
University or graduate school 2938 44.9
JPY, Japanese yen.
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Questionnaire
The framework of the questionnaire was similar to that of Krol
et al. [9,12], although we did not perform the survey on leisure
time and the QALY. To determine whether income reduction
influences utility scores, we obtained utility scores for eight
health states (from severe to mild) with three instruction types:
a) no instruction regarding income; b) explicitly instructed to
consider income reduction (in the case of a homemaker, a
reduction in household work); and c) explicitly instructed not to
consider income reduction (compensated). In the instruction type
a, some, but not all, respondents were expected to spontaneously
consider income loss. In general, people in Japan do not enroll in
private insurance to compensate for temporary income reduction
due to disease, although some public health insurers pay benefit
of two thirds of income for absence from work.
The five dimensions comprising the EuroQol five-dimensional
(EQ-5D) questionnaire include mobility, self-care, usual activities,
pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. Each dimension has
three levels, and patient responses to the EQ-5D questionnaire
can be converted to utility scores (0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect
health, in principle). This five-dimensional descriptive system
can evaluate 243 (35 ¼ 243) different health states. Of the 243
health states, eight were defined by using the Japanese EQ-5D
questionnaire descriptions [18]: two mild states (state 1 ¼ 11121
[Japanese EQ-5D questionnaire utility score of 0.769] and state 2 ¼
11212 [0.750]), three moderate states (state 3 ¼ 22122 [0.619], state
4 ¼ 11323 [0.519], and state 5 ¼ 22223 [0.476]), and three severe
states (state 6 ¼ 23322 [0.386], state 7 ¼ 21333 [0.335], and state 8
¼ 32312 [0.177]). Because instruction regarding income had three
scenarios, we prepared 24 questionnaire patterns (eight health
states  three instruction types).
We obtained utility scores for the 24 patterns by both the
standard gamble (SG) [19] method and the time trade-off (TTO)
[20] method, which are generally used for measuring utility
scores. In both methods, respondents were asked to read about
one health state and imagine themselves in that state.
In the SG method, respondents were asked to choose one of
the following three options: a) continue to live in the described
health state for 10 years, b) receive a new treatment that would
allow them to recover from the disease and either live in
perfect health for 10 years if successful or die soon if unsuc-
cessful (with a stated probability of failure of xx%), and c) no
difference between the options. However, the TTO method
asked respondents to consider a continuous sequence of TTO
tasks. Respondents chose one of the following options that they
preferred: a) continue to live in the assumed health state for 10
years, b) live in perfect health for xx years, and c) both options
are equal. It is assumed that life will end after 10 years in SG or
xx years in TTO. Utility scores less than 0 were not considered
in the TTO survey. Both SG and TTO methods can obtain utility
scores from the indifference point between 10 years of life in a
presented health state with xx% probability of success (SG
method) or xx years in perfect health (TTO method) from the
treatment.
After SG and TTO were performed, respondents allocated to
instruction scenarios a (no instruction) and b (instructed to
consider income reduction) were asked, ‘‘Did you assume income
reduction when you answered the question?’’ (asked only for
scenario a) and ‘‘To what extent did you assume that your income
would be reduced in the health state?’’ The answers to these
questions were used to calculate the percentage of ‘‘those who
spontaneously considered income loss’’ and ‘‘extent of assumed
income loss.’’In summary, the questionnaire was designed to survey the
following points:1. What is the percentage of respondents who spontaneously
consider income loss without any explicit instruction? Does
the percentage vary depending on the severity of health
status?2. Are the utility scores different between questionnaires with or
without instruction? If they were, are they dependent on the
severity of the health status or assumed income loss? In
practice, the difference between utility scores with instruc-
tions a and c is important, because the effect of ‘‘double
counting’’ is negligible if the difference is small.3. What percentage of income do they assume to be lost if
instruction is provided? Are utility scores correlated with the
extent of assumed income loss when instruction b was
provided?4. Is the tendency dependent on the method used (SG or TTO)?
Respondents
Respondents were randomly sampled from the online panel. The
planned sample number was 6400. The panel, which is the
largest in Japan, comprises 1.5 million people (INTAGE, Inc.). We
Table 2 – Percentage of respondents who assumed
reduced income and degree of income reduction.
Instruction a (%)
Instruction
b (%)
P1 P2
P3
(¼P1  P2) P3
State 1: 11121 34.3 28.7 9.8 21.3
State 2: 11212 60.5 33.5 20.3 28.0
State 3: 22212 78.0 41.7 32.5 42.9
State 4: 11323 87.3 53.0 46.2 50.8
State 5: 22223 84.7 48.2 40.8 44.9
State 6: 23322 91.4 64.2 58.7 63.5
State 7: 21333 90.8 58.1 52.7 56.5
State 8: 32312 92.9 70.4 65.3 72.8
Instruction a, no instruction on income; instruction b, explicitly
instructed to consider income reduction; P1, percentage of respon-
dents who assumed reduced income; P2, degree of income reduc-
tion for respondents who assumed reduced income; P3,
percentage of income reduction for all respondents.
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stratified by age and sex. The number of respondents aged more
than 70 years in the panel was too small to sample an unbiased
population. Respondents had a chance to gain small points,
which can be used for Internet shopping, but did not receive
money. Students were excluded because it was unlikely that
they worked for a living. This study was conducted in
November 2011.
To avoid excessive burden on respondents, we randomly
allocated respondents to 1 of 24 patterns, with 250 responses
expected for each pattern. Respondents were asked to evaluate
one pattern by both the SG and TTO methods, with the sequence
of methods randomized. The first question was used to screen for
respondents who failed to understand the questions or
responded inappropriately. We excluded respondents who chose
clearly unreasonable options for either method. For example, in
the SG method, we excluded respondents who answered that
‘‘live in the described health state for 10 years’’ was more
preferable than ‘‘live in perfect health for 10 years.’’ The number
of excluded respondents is not included in the table shown in the
‘‘Results’’ section.Table 3 – Average utility scores by instruction type.
Instruction a
n SG TTO n
Mild
State 1: 11121 254 0.870 0.789 308
State 2: 11212 276 0.823 0.667 253
Moderate
State 3: 22212 259 0.643 0.573 262
State 4: 11323 259 0.546 0.419 270
State 5: 22223 268 0.552 0.458 254
Severe
State 6: 23322 267 0.409 0.351 269
State 7: 21333 262 0.445 0.375 271
State 8: 32312 266 0.368 0.329 270
Instruction a, no instruction on income; instruction b, explicitly instruct
not to consider income reduction; SG, standard gamble; TTO, time tradeStatistical Analysis
We converted responses from the SG and TTO methods to utility
scores and performed statistical analysis. To consider the influ-
ence of background demographic factors, utility scores were
analyzed with a simple multiple linear regression model that
included instruction scenario (two dummy variables of scenario b
and scenario c), employment pattern (full employment ¼ 1),
education (university or graduate school ¼ 1), sex (female ¼ 1),
household income (Japanese yen [JPY] 1 million), age (four
dummy variables of respondents in their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s),
and marital status (married ¼ 1). To confirm the effect of income
decrease, we performed the analysis by adding the degree to which
income was lost to the above linear model for instruction b.
In addition, we defined ‘‘compensation effect’’ as the differ-
ence in utility scores between instruction scenarios b (explicitly
instructed to consider income reduction) and c (explicitly
instructed not to consider income reduction). The difference
implies how much compensation of income increases utility
scores in the same health states. ‘‘Income effect’’ was defined
as the ‘‘estimated coefficient of income loss’’ (by regression
model including income loss)  ‘‘the percentage of income reduc-
tion’’ respondents assumed: it is a potential increase in utility
scores if loss of income is completely recovered. The ‘‘compen-
sation effect’’/‘‘income effect’’ for each health state was calcu-
lated to confirm how much compensation of income loss
improves a potential increase in utility scores.
All analyses were performed by using mixed procedures with
SASs 9.1.Results
A total of 6551 respondents completed the questionnaire. Dem-
ographic characteristics are shown in Table 1. Sampling stratifi-
cation by sex and age was successful. The average household
income of respondents was approximately JPY 6.2 million (US
$80,000, US $1 ¼ JPY 78), although that of the average Japanese
household, excluding elderly households, was JPY 6.1 million (US
$78,000) in 2009 [21]. The proportion of the Japanese population in
each region in 2010 was 11.7% in Hokkaido/Tohoku, 33.1% in
Kanto, 16.9% in Chubu, 17.7% in Kansai, 5.9% in Chugoku, 3.1% in
Shikoku, and 11.5% in Kyushu [22]. Respondent demographics
were similar to the Japanese general population. According to
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development data
in 2009 [23], 25% of the Japanese population attained a tertiaryInstruction b Instruction c
SG TTO n SG TTO
0.850 0.754 296 0.860 0.767
0.789 0.637 285 0.799 0.664
0.614 0.508 281 0.667 0.530
0.519 0.428 278 0.539 0.477
0.520 0.444 281 0.584 0.471
0.375 0.306 291 0.430 0.356
0.383 0.367 288 0.478 0.420
0.302 0.303 283 0.378 0.326
ed to consider income reduction; instruction c, explicitly instructed
-off.
Table 4 – Results of multivariable model.
Mild Moderate Severe
State 1
(n ¼ 858)
State 2
(n ¼ 814)
State 3
(n ¼ 807)
State 4
(n ¼ 802)
State 5
(n ¼ 803)
State 6
(n ¼ 821)
State 7
(n ¼ 827)
State 8
(n ¼ 819)
SG
Instruction type#
Instruction b 0.020 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.061 0.035 0.066
Instruction c 0.011 0.024 0.011 0.018 0.033 0.036 0.018 0.006
Employment
Full-time
employment
0.034 0.050y 0.008 0.043 0.033 0.017 0.022 0.034
Education
University or
graduate school
0.019 0.023 0.028 0.054 0.012 0.022 0.032 0.010
Household income
(JPY 1 million)
0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
Sex
Female 0.009 0.033 0.012 0.035 0.057 0.061 0.071y 0.039
Age (y)
20–29 0.064 0.084 0.123 0.226 0.136 0.112 0.128 0.038
30–39 0.075 0.089 0.131 0.165 0.162 0.149 0.088 0.050
40–49 0.027 0.037 0.017 0.092 0.129 0.143 0.092 0.051
50–59 0.015 0.001 0.053 0.005 0.118y 0.037 0.024 0.038
Marital status
Married 0.008 0.029 0.020 0.008 0.051 0.009 0.044 0.015
TTO
Instruction type#
Instruction b 0.037 0.033 0.008 0.070 0.015 0.002 0.046 0.028
Instruction c 0.023 0.009 0.053 0.047 0.013 0.052 0.001 0.005
Employment
Full-time
employment
0.035 0.026 0.027 0.044 0.029 0.050 0.008 0.029
Education
University or
graduate school
0.008 0.055 0.063 0.020 0.004 0.061 0.048 0.009
Household income
(JPY 1 million)
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Sex
Female 0.007 0.086 0.046 0.031 0.083 0.087 0.087 0.081z
Age (y)
20–29 0.031 0.072 0.041 0.144 0.006 0.016 0.078 0.057
30–39 0.006 0.024 0.035 0.063 0.085 0.034 0.088y 0.031
40–49 0.020 0.026 0.054 0.059 0.044 0.078 0.083 0.034
50–59 0.015 0.008 0.017 0.025 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.087
Marital status
Married 0.031 0.015 0.012 0.003 0.036 0.000 0.001 0.051
Instruction a, no instruction on income; instruction b, explicitly instructed to consider income reduction; instruction c, explicitly instructed
not to consider income reduction; JPY, Japanese yen; SG, standard gamble; TTO, time trade-off.
# Reference level is instruction a.
 P o0.05.
 Po0.01.
VA L U E I N H E A LT H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 5 8 1 – 5 8 7 585education (type A, college, or graduate). In contrast, 45% of
our respondents graduated from college or graduate school,
indicating a somewhat higher educational level in the study
population.
Table 2 presents the percentage of respondents who assumed
income was lost, and the degree to which income was lost. As
utility scores decreased, the percentage and degree of income
loss increased. Respondents assumed that income was reduced
by more than 50% when they evaluated severe health states.
More than 90% of the respondents considered income reduction
for severe health states even without being instructed to do so.Average utility scores are shown in Table 3. For both methods,
utility scores with instruction scenario c (explicitly instructed not
to consider income reduction) were larger than those with
instruction scenario b (explicitly instructed to consider income
reduction). The comparison between a (no instruction regarding
income) and c, however, was inconsistent. Differences in utility
scores among the three instruction scenarios were small for all
health states. In particular, the difference between a and c was
smaller than that between b and c.
Table 4 shows results of the multivariable regression model,
including instruction type and demographic characteristics.
Table 5 – Relation between income loss and utility score.
SG TTO
Decrease of utility per income loss (%) P Decrease of utility per income loss (%) P
State 1: 11121 0.0031 o0.0001 0.0035 o0.0001
State 2: 11212 0.0031 o0.0001 0.0031 o0.0001
State 3: 22212 0.0032 o0.0001 0.0037 o0.0001
State 4: 11323 0.0040 o0.0001 0.0035 o0.0001
State 5: 22223 0.0031 o0.0001 0.0033 o0.0001
State 6: 23322 0.0047 o0.0001 0.0022 o0.0001
State 7: 21333 0.0053 o0.0001 0.0039 o0.0001
State 8: 32312 0.0022 0.0006 0.0015 0.01
SG, standard gamble; TTO, time trade-off.
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instruction scenario (b and c) and not including an instruction
scenario (a). The differences in utility scores between instruc-
tions a and c were less than 0.05. Age influenced utility scores in
the SG method but not in the TTO method. Utility scores of
respondents in their 20s and 30s tended to be lower than of those
in their 60s for the SG. For the TTO, female respondent scores
were lower in more than half of the eight health states. However,
household income was unrelated to utility scores. We observed
no interaction between instruction type and demographic char-
acteristics. Table 5 presents the relationship between utility
scores and degree of assumed income reduction. All coefficients
of income reduction were significantly larger than zero and
ranged from 0.002 to 0.004. For instance, if respondents
assumed a 10% reduction in income, the utility scores decreased
by 0.02 to 0.04.
We calculated ‘‘compensation effect’’ as the difference in
utility scores between instruction scenarios b and c from
Table 3. ‘‘Income effect’’ was obtained by multiplying the ‘‘esti-
mated coefficient of income loss’’ listed in Table 5 by ‘‘the
percentage of income reduction’’ listed in Table 2. The ‘‘income
effect’’ was much higher than the ‘‘compensation effect.’’ The
average ‘‘compensation effect’’/‘‘income effect’’ was only 20% to
30% for both SG and TTO, which suggests that compensation of
income is not sufficient to recover utility scores to expected
values.Discussion
In this study, we examined the influence of income reduction on
utility scores. Respondent demographics were similar to the
Japanese general population, although educational level was
somewhat higher in the study population. Previous surveys were
inconclusive, but this large-sample survey has clear implications.
First, even without being instructed about income reduction,
many respondents spontaneously assumed that income was lost.
The percentage tended to be higher when considering more
severe health states. Second, the degree of assumed income
reduction was related to utility scores. For a 10% income reduc-
tion, respondents assumed a utility score decrease of 0.02 to 0.04.
Third, compared with the ‘‘no instruction’’ scenario, utility scores
did not change significantly, even when income reduction was
compensated. These results were not dependent on the SG or
TTO method.
The second and third findings seem inconsistent. An assumed
income reduction clearly influenced utility scores, so why did
compensation for lost income fail to sufficiently improve utility
scores? The average ‘‘compensation effect’’/‘‘income effect’’ was
only 20% to 30% for both SG and TTO methods. This suggests thatcompensation of income loss was not enough to increase utility
scores to the expected scores. One interpretation of this obser-
vation is that the ‘‘income effect’’does not reflect wage loss alone.
Income reduction is clearly correlated with the amount of work.
People who cannot work satisfactorily have less income, but
people may also work for human relationships, social participa-
tion, self-fulfillment, and so on. Thus, factors other than wages
likely had a stronger influence on the decrease in utility scores.
Because these factors are not directly related to productivity of
patients, it is likely that this supports the negligibility of double
counting.
According to Table 5, there were no statistically significant
differences between the ‘‘no instruction’’ scenario and ‘‘with
instruction’’ scenarios. The maximum difference between
instruction a (no instruction regarding income) and instruction
c (explicitly instructed not to consider income reduction) was
estimated to be 0.05. One study estimated the minimally impor-
tant difference (MID) as 0.040 for the EQ-5D questionnaire (US
algorithm) and 0.082 for the EQ-5D questionnaire (UK algorithm)
[24]. Another study reported that the MID was 0.07 to 0.12 for
the EQ-5D questionnaire (UK algorithm) and 0.06 to 0.09 for the
EQ-5D questionnaire (US algorithm) in patients with cancer [25].
The MID for the utility score measured by the EQ-5D question-
naire is not necessarily clear. Compared with these MID values,
however, the effect of instruction is small, which may suggest no
need for considering double counting.
The recommendation of the Washington panel reflected con-
cerns about double counting of QALYs and productivity loss;
however, our results suggest that the impact of double counting
is negligible. Meltzer and Johannesson suggest that ‘‘this would
be best addressed by instructing individuals to provide QALY
weights based on the assumption that their financial circum-
stances would not vary with health states y’’ [26]. While this is
important, our results suggest that special instruction may not be
needed.
Some studies conceptually similar to ours have been pub-
lished. Myers et al. [27] randomly allocated 181 students to one of
two groups, with or without instruction, and observed that ‘‘the
overall mean quality of life for the informed group was signifi-
cantly lower than that of the uninformed group’’ (0.714 vs. 0.814
by the SG method). Our results are consistent with those of
another study [28] that asked 222 members of the general
population to value three health states (mild [HS1], moderate
[HS2], and severe [HS3]) with the TTO method. They used the
same three randomly allocated instruction types as in our study
(no instruction, instruction including income loss, and instruc-
tion excluding income loss) and found no significant difference in
utility scores among the instruction types for any of the health
states. The difference in utility scores between the groups
including and excluding income loss was small: 0.00 (HS1),
VA L U E I N H E A LT H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 5 8 1 – 5 8 7 5870.02 (HS2), and 0.07 (HS3), and utility scores were essentially the
same between the no instruction and including income loss
groups.
In general, some people in Japan have social security for
absence from work due to disease that compensates for a part of
temporary income reduction, although this is not the case in
other countries. Moreover, our results may reflect, at least in part,
both the culture and the preference for work in Japan. As these
conditions change, it is possible that these results cannot be
simply extrapolated to other countries. The generalization of
results must be considered deliberately in each country.
The present study was Web-based, and respondents were
sampled from Web panels. Web-based survey research has some
advantages. For example, irrelevant questions can be avoided if
the appropriate algorithm is used. In our view, Web-based
surveys are suited for sequential questions that are branched
by responses to the previous question, as in the SG and TTO
methods. In addition, the SG and TTO methods are conceptually
easy to visualize. Thus, such surveys may help respondents
understand the difference between two alternative answers more
easily.
Despite the benefits of Web-based surveys, some insist that
face-to-face interviews are desirable for obtaining detailed infor-
mation and controlling testing conditions. In the present study,
the decision to adopt a Web-based survey approach was
prompted by the need to sample many respondents. Indeed,
obtaining a sample population that includes respondents from all
over Japan is much easier with a Web-based survey than with
face-to-face interviews. Although respondents were randomly
recruited (although not from the entire Japanese population) and
stratified by age and sex, the size of the online panel was large
and the major characteristics of respondents were similar to
those of the general Japanese population. Thus, it is possible that
responses to our questions would have been different had the
survey been conducted among the general Japanese population.
We did not consider the relationship between opportunity
costs of leisure time and QALYs, although economic evaluation
explicitly considering leisure time is rare. In contrast with
productivity costs, the Washington panel insisted that leisure
time should be included in costs, while the Erasmus group
disagreed and suggested that it should be treated as a change
in utility score [5,6]. Further studies will be needed to assess the
relationship between utility scores and leisure time.Conclusions
Despite the lack of instruction on income reduction, many respond-
ents spontaneously assumed lost income. The proportion tended to
be higher when considering more severe health states. The degree
of assumed income reduction was related to utility scores. For a 10%
income reduction, respondents assumed a 0.02- to 0.04-decrease in
utility score (both SG and TTO methods). However, utility scores did
not change significantly when the decrease in income was com-
pensated compared with when no instruction was given. The
differences in utility scores were less than 0.05. In our view, the
‘‘income effect’’ does not reflect wage loss alone. Therefore, our
results suggest that the impact of double counting is negligible.
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